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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter "Mrs. Parkhurst") submits the 
following as her Brief of Appellant herein: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
2(h) (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order granting Mr. Toone's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and denying Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment regarding Mrs. Parkhurst's Petition to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce or Partition the Military Retirement benefits. 
The order was entered by the Honorable Judge Gordon J. Low of the 
First Judicial District Court, Cache County, State of Utah, sitting 
without a jury and hearing the case as a case of first impression 
in Utah regarding the effects of McCarty. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in alluding 
that the military retirement benefits had been silently adjudicated 
to Mr. Toone when in reality the Decree of Divorce did not mention 
the military retirement benefits; both parties stipulated that the 
military retirement benefits had not been specifically or expressly 
divided; McCarty forbade state courts from dividing or offsetting 
military retirement in the divorce as a matter of law; and when 
USFSPA overturned McCarty each former spouse became tenants-in-
common to the retirement until a formal division occurs? 
2* Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding 
that the doctrine of res judicata was appropriate in this case 
where the evidence indicated that the military retirement benefits 
were not specifically mentioned in the Decree of Divorce, the trial 
court had retained exclusive jurisdiction under the original Decree 
as well as the Supplemental Decree to revise other property matters 
under the Decree of Divorce, and USFSPA specifically allows 
retroactive modification of divorces such as this one entered after 
June 25, 1981? 
2 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding 
that the eight year statute of limitation barred Mrs. Parkhurst's 
Petition to Modify where no ouster of the cotenants occurred; where 
her partition action is an equitable remedy governed by the 
equitable doctrine of laches and not the statute of limitation; 
where USFSPA specifically granted retroactive treatment to reopen 
decrees entered after June 25, 1981; where the original Decree 
retained jurisdiction and the Supplemental Decree of Divorce was 
not entered until December 16, 1983 and specifically reserved the 
right to either party to file a motion to divide the marital 
property after December 16, 1988; and where the parties became 
tenants-in-common to the military retirement benefits under USFSPA, 
creating a new claim and a substantial change in circumstances 
governed by the courts continuing jurisdiction under U.C.A. § 3 0-3-
5 (1995). 
4 . Did the trial court err by concluding that as a matter of 
equity that Mrs. Parkhurst's filing of the partition action 
fourteen (14) years after entry of the first Decree of Divorce was 
late and untimely where the lower court specifically ruled that 
neither laches nor estoppel could bar Mrs. Parkhurst's claim; where 
the retirement had not been withdrawn and would not be disbursed 
until May 3, 1998; and where, under the lower court's decision, Mr. 
Toone would receive one hundred percent (100%) of the retirement 
benefits, when the trial court obviously intended each party to 
receive fifty percent (50%) of the marital estate? 
3 
5. Did the trial court err by relying on the Throckmorton 
case where Throckmorton involves a divorce in 1978 (not after June 
25, 1981) ; is not a military retirement case; where Woodward, could 
be applied to this divorce since judgment was entered after 
Woodward; and the facts make it totally distinguishable? 
6. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in denying 
Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment to divide the 
military benefits when legal precedent in a majority of 
jurisdictions permits division of military retirement post-divorce? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) 
which is codified under 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (c) (1) (1990 as amended) 
along with U.C.A. § 30-3-5 (1) & (3) (1995) maybe determinative of the 
outcome of this appeal. Also the cases cited by Appellant in this 
Brief may be determinative of the outcome in this appeal, 
particularly since the majority of those cases hold that military 
retirement benefits can be divided post-divorce where the divorce 
was entered after June 25, 1981. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in this appeal as to the issue 
presented on appeal is a "correctness standard" in reviewing the 
trial court's Conclusions of Law in the application of legal 
principles such as res judicata, statute of limitations, and the 
substantial change in circumstances test in denying Mrs. 
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Parkhurst's request where the review pays no deference to trial 
courts holding. See State Farm Fire Casualty Co. v. Grearv, 869 
P.2d 952, 1954 (Ut. App. 1994); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 936 (Utah 
1994) . The other standard of review is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in granting Mr. Toone 's Motion for Summary 
Judgment based solely on the affidavits before it, under principles 
of equity (such as partition, laches and estoppel), since the 
affidavits do not reveal harm to Mr. Toone or unreasonable delay by 
Mrs. Parkhurst smd the trial court's decision was so unreasonable 
in this area that it was arbitrary, capricious and a clear abuse of 
discretion. See Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434-36 (Utah 
1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from an Order granting Mr. Toone's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Order was entered on September 25, 1996 in 
the First Judicial District Court in and for Cache County, Utah, by 
the Honorable Judge Gordon J. Low. (R.O.A. 23 9) (Exhibit "E" 
attached hereto). 
The Order stemmed from the following procedural facts: Lynn 
Vincent Toone and Ruby Joan Toone were married on June 20, 1958 in 
Manti, Utah. (R.O.A. 239) Mr. Toone began creditable time for 
service in the Navy by working from March 1958 to the end of 1979 
which qualified him for full vesting of twenty (20) years of 
military service, some ten (10) years active duty and some eleven 
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(11) years in the Naval Reserve. (R.O.A. 240) During all of Mr. 
Toone's creditable time of military service the parties had been 
married a total of twenty-three years [over ten (10) years as 
required by 10 U.S.C. § 1408]. (R.O.A. 239-240) Mrs. Toone (nka 
Parkhurst) supported Mr. Toone and made it possible for him to 
qualify for this retirement. (R.O.A. 141-43) On June 25, 1981, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), 
ruled that federal law preempted the application of state marital 
property concepts to military retirement benefits and disallowed 
state court authority to divide military retirement benefits in a 
divorce. When Mr. Toone filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce on 
or about June 22, 1981 (R.O.A. 1) and Mrs. Toone filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim on or about June 29, 1981, (R.O.A. 4), the McCartv 
decision did not permit marital division of military retirement by 
a state court. The parties agreed to bifurcate the divorce 
proceedings and permit Mr. Toone a divorce so he could remarry. 
(R.O.A. 18) The trial court granted Mr. Toone a bifurcated divorce 
on July 23, 1981 and retained specific jurisdiction to divide all 
other marital property at a later date. (R.O.A. 18) (See Exhibit 
"A" paragraph 2). 
On July 9, 1982, the trial court held a trial on all other 
reserved issues (except for the naval retirement) and made Findings 
and an Order and asked Mr. Toone's attorney, Arden Lauritzen, to 
prepare the final papers and to present the same for the judge's 
signature. (R.O.A. 29-30) (Also see Exhibit "B" Trial Transcript). 
On September 2, 1983, Mr. Toone filed a motion for Further 
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Proceedings and to correct exhibits prior to submitting the 
Findings and Order to the court for signature. (R.O.A. 31) The 
court denied this request. (R.O.A. 38) Mr. Toone's attorney took 
so long to file the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Decree of Divorce, that Mrs. Parkhurst's attorney finally prepared 
the Findings and submitted Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law together with a Supplemental Judgment and Decree 
which were signed and dated December 14, 1983. (R.O.A. at 41 & 59) 
Corrected Supplemental Findings and Judgment and Decree were 
entered on December 16, 1983. (R.O.A. at 50 & 68) (See Exhibit "C" 
for Corrected Supplemental Judgment and Decree). 
The trial court specifically ruled in paragraph 6 of the 
Corrected Supplemental Judgment and Decree (hereafter "Decree") 
that Mr. Toone's Utah State nonmilitary retirement was worth 
approximately $10,000.00 and Mrs. Parkhurst's Utah State retirement 
was worth about $3,000.00. (R.O.A. 70 & 181 to 185) (See also 
Exhibit "C" paragraph 6) . The court offset these two (2) civil 
retirements one against the other leaving $7,000.00, which it 
divided equally between the parties by granting $3,500.00 to Mrs. 
Parkhurst. (R.O.A. 70) The affidavits, subsequent exhibits and 
Findings and Decree show that the court dealt only with the civil 
retirements of the parties and that the "navy" retirement was never 
mentioned and was totally omitted from the trial court evidence as 
well as the Findings and Decree. (R.O.A. 125, Exhibit "C" paragraph 
10 of Decree). 
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In paragraph 4 of the Corrected Decree, the court retained 
jurisdiction for a period of five (5) years at the expiration of 
which time either party could file a motion with the court to 
revise the due date on Mrs. Parkhurst's equitable lien against the 
home which the court was allowing Mr. Toone to pay over a period of 
twenty (20) years and also reserved jurisdiction to revise any 
other property matters. (R.O.A. 70) Mr. Toone filed an objection 
requiring the trial court to make sure either party could file 
motions after the five (5) years expired. (R.O.A. 78) The trial 
court interlineated in paragraph 4 of the Decree, the change which 
allowed motions to be filed after the five (5) years ended in 
December of 1988. (R.O.A. 70) (Exhibit "C" paragraph 4; Exhibit MB" 
page 7). 
Mrs. Parkhurst filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of 
Divorce on or about October 23, 1995 to receive her one-half (M) 
share of the naval retirement. (R.O.A. 106) Mr. Toone filed an 
Answer on November 1, 1995. (R.O.A. 110) Mr. Toone then filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on January 18, 1996 (R.O.A. 115), and 
Mrs. Parkhurst filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on or 
about February 1, 1996. (R.O.A. 144) The only sworn testimony is 
contained in Mr. Toone's affidavit (R.O.A. 124-125) and Mrs. 
Parkhurst's affidavits (R.O.A. 139 to 143). The court entered a 
Memorandum Decision (R.O.A. 226, Exhibit "D") and Amended Order 
(R.O.A. 239, Exhibit "E"), based on the parties Motions, denying 
Mrs. Parkhurst's request to divide the naval retirement on 
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September 25, 1996. Mrs. Parkhurst filed a Notice of Appeal on 
October 15, 1996. (R.O.A. 246) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as 
this appeal, both parties admit that the naval retirement benefits 
were not specifically divided in the trial court's Decree of 
Divorce. Moreover, no oral discussion took place during trial or 
written mention of military retirement benefits were made in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (See Affidavit of Lynn 
Toone, paragraph 6 which states "The Decree of Divorce does not 
specify an allocation of military retirement benefits between the 
parties.") (R.O.A. 125 and affidavit of Joan Parkhurst, page 2 
R.O.A. 142; Exhibit "B", page 5, Exhibit "C" paragraph 10). 
Both parties admit for purposes of this appeal that the only 
retirements mentioned in the Decree of Divorce are Mr. Toone's 
retirement of $10,000.00 from Utah State Retirement System and Mrs. 
Parkhurst's retirement of $3,000.00 at Utah State University. 
(R.O.A. 175 to 185) . The parties admit for purposes of this 
appeal that only two (2) civil retirements were discussed in the 
court's evidence and Findings. 
Both parties acknowledge that the military retirement benefits 
have not been withdrawn by Mr. Toone and he will not start to 
receive those benefits until his 60th birthday on May 3, 1998. 
(Affidavit of Lynn Toone (R.O.A. 125) and facts presented in 
9 
paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Response to Mrs. Parkhurst's Request for 
Reconsideration R.O.A. 208, paragraph 6). 
Both parties also acknowledge that Mrs. Parkhurst was married 
to Mr. Toone for twenty-three (23) years, that Mr. Toone worked for 
the military retirement benefits for more than twenty years and 
that those military retirement benefits were earned entirely during 
the marriage (except for 2 or 3 months in 1958). (R.O.A. 208, 
paragraph 6) 
Both parties stipulate that Mrs. Parkhurst was awarded only 
$1.00 per month as alimony in the Decree of Divorce and that no 
alimony has been paid by Mr. Toone to Mrs. Parkhurst. (R.O.A. 70) 
The parties basic disputed facts are over why Mrs. Parkhurst 
waited so long to bring the action to divide the naval retirement 
benefits. Mr. Toone also contends that the naval retirement was 
silently adjudicated by the trial court and awarded to Mr. Toone by 
default although no written evidence supports this claim and Mrs. 
Parkhurst flatly denies this claim. 
The lower court ruled that estoppel and laches were not a bar 
to Mrs. Parkhurst's claim since no harm has occurred to Mr. Toone 
by Mrs. Parkhurst's action or inaction. (See Amended Order 
granting Summary Judgment, page 4 paragraph 3, Exhibit "E", R.O.A. 
243). It was undisputed that Mrs. Parkhurst did not learn of 
USFSPA until 1995 and that she acted reasonably thereafter. (R.O.A. 
232). The lower court also agreed that if Mrs. Parkhurst had 
brought her action earlier (i.e., within the eight-year statute of 
limitation) that Mrs. Parkhurst may have had a legitimate claim if 
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she could avoid the principle of res judicata. (R.O.A. paragraph 1, 
193; 226-227) The main focus of the lower court was on the length 
of time which had passed since the divorce order and on the 
doctrine of res judicata. (R.O.A. 226 to 239) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issues presently before this Court are of first impression 
in this state. The main issue is whether military retirement, 
expressly omitted from the Findings and Decree in a divorce decided 
after June 25, 1981, can now be divided pursuant to USFSPA and 
state law. 
Mrs. Parkhurst's Brief will show the Court that Utah law, 
prior to McCartv, allowed for the equitable division of pension 
rights, retirement benefits, annuities and military retirement 
benefits. But for McCarty, Utah case law would have permitted an 
equitable division of the current military retirement before the 
Court. The lower court agreed. (R.O.A. 233) However, because of 
McCarty, the trial court could not consider, offset, or divide the 
military retirement. As a matter of law, the military retirement 
was not adjudicated nor could it have been adjudicated. Upon this 
issue the trial court erred. The trial transcript, Findings and 
Decree all indicate that the marital property, including the civil 
retirements, were divided 50/50 and no mention or reference was 
made to the military retirement. Res judicata does not bar Mrs. 
Parkhurst from seeking a division of the military retirement 
benefits. There are several cases which have decided that issue 
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and which hold that because McCarty forbade the division of 
military retirement benefits by state courts and further forbade 
any adjustment in the award of other community property to counter-
balance or offset the loss of these benefits that res judicata 
cannot apply. 
Partition actions to divide military retirement benefits have 
been allowed in post McCarty divorce decrees which did not 
expressly award the military retirement benefits to the service 
member. Omission of certain property from a decree of divorce does 
not affect the divorce's finality. It merely means that the 
omitted property is to be held by the former spouses as tenants in 
common since it was not formally divided by the court. Partition 
is and has always been available as a means of dividing property 
not formally divided upon divorce. 
Only if the divorce court -\had specifically adjudicated or 
expressly stated in the decree a division of the retirement 
benefits would res judicata bar a subsequent suit for partition of 
the military retirement benefits in this case. The judgment is res 
judicata only to present and not future conditions. Because the 
enactment of USFSPA created a new fact and a change in the law, a 
new cause of action arose. This was a future condition to which 
res judicata does not apply. 
Nor can Mrs. Parkhurst's claim be denied because of the 
statute of limitations. The statute of limitation defense is not 
applicable for several reasons. 
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First, this is a partition action against military benefits 
which were omitted from the Decree. Because USFSPA overturned the 
McCartv decision, t lit." retirement benefits here reverted to the 
parties as tenants in common for which no disposition was made, 
thus giving the partitioners the right to divide this property at 
any time. The trial court erroneously thought it stayed in Mr. 
Toone's ownership only. 
For the statute of limitations to begin to run in a partition 
action, there must first be an ouster of one tenant against the 
other. Neither party had been ousted by court :u-i * lis 
federal benefit, which arguably Coin unly be divided r a court 
ruling. Since there was no ouster and no division of the property, 
each party remained in possession of their rights t miliary 
benefits until somco'iit.: began an action to do otherwise. The trial 
court erroneously held the limitations began to run on December 16, 
1983 or February 1, 1983. 
Second, the statute of limitation is a legal defense used 
against legal remedies. Divorce courts and partition actions are 
equitable remedies and it wns inappropriate for the court to use 
the legal defense of a eight-year statute of limitation to bar Mrs. 
Parkhurst's claim as mentioned in the above paragraph. Mr. Toone 
could only assert the defense of laches in this case. Laches is 
not appropriate in this case as will be shown below and the trial 
court acknowledged this. 
Third, provisions of USFSPA specifically allow parties 
retroactive benefits in divorce cases that happen after June 25, 
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1981 particularly when there is a specific reservation, as in this 
case, for a later property division. The Decree of Divorce also 
reserved jurisdiction to permit later property divisions which 
reservations preclude the use of the statute of limitations to bar 
this claim. 
Lastly, the court has continuing jurisdiction under U.C.A. § 
30-3-5 on new issues to make new orders. There is no statute of 
limitations for such continuing jurisdiction. A substantial change 
in circumstances allows reopening of the Decree. The enactment of 
USFSPA and Woodward, both created a substantial change in 
circumstances when other facts are considered herein. 
For the defense of laches to apply, there must be a lack of 
diligence on the part of Mrs. Parkhurst and resulting injury to Mr. 
Toone. Equity does not encourage laches, and the doctrine may not 
be invoked to defeat justice bufr only to prevent injustice. The 
equitable defense of laches would only be available to prevent 
unfairness to a spouse who may have spent the money in reliance on 
the judgment. However, that is not the case here since the money 
has not yet been received by either party and will not be received 
until 1998. Furthermore, knowledge of the enactment of USFSPA, may 
not be imputed to Mrs. Parkhurst. That is a "new fact" that cannot 
be imputed. It created new evidence to divide retirement. Upon 
this issue the trial court erred. Rather, the delay must be 
unreasonable under the circumstances, including the party's actual 
subjective knowledge of her right, and it must be shown that any 
change in the circumstances caused by the delay has resulted in 
14 
prejudice l- Mr Toone sufficient to justify denial of relief. 
Courts have held that the critical date upon which » base laches 
or statute of liir: .:' l-;.,s Is when the wife first gained actual 
knowledge of .;-.-. rights under USFSPA. Mrs. Parkhurst, after 
learning about her rights under USFSPA i :* < : imely and filed her 
Petition. When one considers the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Mrs. Parkhurst, the trial court abused its discretion 
in holding against her. 
Utah case law prior to the McCarty Decision made it clear that 
the general rule as established in Englert v. Englert, 576 P. 2d 
1274 (Utah 1978) was that the trial court's duty is to make an 
equitable division of property in a divorce action which 
"encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the 
parties, whenev ei obtained ai id from whatever source derived; and 
that this includes any such pension fund or insurance. " Id. at 
1276. 
The retirement benefits in this case were fully vested prior 
to the date of divorce. Mr. Toone had served over twenty (20) 
years in the military naval retirement system. The parties had 
been married for twenty-three (23) years. Federal law permits 
division of retirements in those cases and have set up a procedure 
for so doing under USFSPA. Utah law not only allowed for the 
division of such property but also found creative ways for insuring 
that the other spouse received equitable treatment if one party did 
receive all of the retirement, such as lump sum alimony awards, 
survivor annuity benefits, larger alimony payments, claim upon the 
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other spouse's estate upon death, and various other methods. More 
recent Utah cases indicate that waiting until the retirement is 
actually distributed and entering an order dividing the same at 
that time might even be more equitable. In this case, the trial 
court in 1982 could have easily ruled that once the retirement 
annuity payments began each party would receive fifty percent (50%) 
of that annuity payment. 
However, because of the ruling in McCarty, the trial court had 
no authority or jurisdiction to divide the military retirement or 
to offset it against other marital property. It is also evident 
from the trial court's findings that it did not consider the 
military retirement. Mrs. Parkhurst did not receive extra alimony 
or other extra property to offset the military retirement benefits 
of Mr. Toone. The trial court decision was in error on this 
matter. Because McCarty has now been overturned and USFSPA has 
been enacted to permit retroactive adjustments to avoid the 
inequities caused by McCarty it is not only fair and equitable for 
the court to divide the same but justice requires it. 
Obviously, because the trial court divided all marital 
property 50/50 and did not take into consideration the military 
retirement benefit or provide any offsets or adjustments for those 
military retirement benefits, an injustice will result if Mr. Toone 
were to receive one hundred percent (100%) of those benefits. Mrs. 
Parkhurst is asking that she receive fifty percent (50%) of those 
benefits, not all of them. The trial court's decision in denying 
Mrs. Parkhurst's Motion for Summary Judgment, however, and in 
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granting Mi Toone's Summary Judgment Motion effectively gives Mr. 
Toone an unintended windfall to one hundred percent (100%) of those 
benefits without -^.:sr' ••":'. o: ffset to Mrs Parkhurst. 
USFSPA, and ail of :.--. iaws surrounding these issues make it clear 
that the court should lean towards creating equit:\ rathei ohan an 
injustice and that courts should find a way to treat both parties 
fairly rather than find ways to block Mrs. Parkhurst's Petition 
legal theories of res judicata and statue of limitations. It was 
err for the trial court to foreclose Mrs. Parkhurst's ability to 
receive her share of the retirement funds, 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
 P R I N C I P L E 0F 
"RES JUDICATA" BARRED APPELLANT'S CLAIM TO A DIVISION OF 
THE NAVAL RETIREMENT WHERE THE NAVAL RETIREMENT WAS NOT 
EXPRESSLY ADJUDICATED BY THE TRIAL COURT, NOR COULD IT 
HAVE BEEN UNDER THE DECISION OF MCCARTY, AND WHERE THE 
LATER ENACTING OF (USFSPA) ELIMINATED THE HORRORS CAUSED 
BY MCCARTY, AND SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED THAT DIVORCES 
OCCURRING AFTER JUNE 25, 1981 COULD BE REOPENED TO ALLOW 
FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO MODIFY OR 
DIVIDE MILITARY RETIREMENT. 
The doctrine of res judicata is applicable only in the 
following situations: 
When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata 
as to those issues which were either (1) tried and determined, or 
(2) upon all issues which the party had a fair opportunity to 
present and have determined in the other proceeding. Throckmorton 
v. Throckmorton, 123 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). However, 
in order for a claim to be barred by res judicata, both the prior 
claim and the current claim must meet three requirements: 
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1. Both actions must involve the same parties, their 
prievies, or their assignees; 
2. The claim that is asserted to be barred must have been 
presented or be such that it could have been presented in the 
first case; and 
3. The first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Fitzgerald 
v. Corvit, 793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990). 
In the present case item one was met but items 2 and 3 were 
not. Item 2 was not met because the trial court could not divide 
the military retirement since McCarty v. McCarty, 453 US 210 (1981) 
held that federal law precluded a state court from dividing 
military retirement pay pursuant to state property laws, or even 
using it to offset property in the divorce. Jd. at 22 9 and 
Hisguierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 588 (1979) . 
If McCarty precluded the trial court from even hearing the 
matter or allowing a party to bring the matter before it, then 
there was no way Mrs. Parkhurst could have had a fair opportunity 
to present and have determined that issue in the first trial. Both 
parties stipulate and agree that the issue was not presented to the 
court and the only question is whether by silence it was awarded to 
Mr. Toone by default. 
Several cases since McCarty have held that res judicata does 
not bar a partition suit brought by a former spouse of a service 
member to obtain a division of the military retirement benefits. 
McCarty rests on the premise that the purpose of the statute that 
created military retirement would be frustrated if state courts 
were allowed to divide the retirement in divorce proceedings. 
Thus, to prevent this result, the Supreme Court held that the 
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federal statute superseded state property laws that allowed for the 
division of military retirements. Surely, the purpose the 
federal statute would also be frustrated if a state court was 
allowed to offset military retirement against other marital 
property. Accordingly, because the trial court wae silent :m the 
treatment of the military retirement benefits, Mr. Toone cannot now 
argue that Mrs. Parkhurst somehow received additional property as 
an offset against the military retirement: benefits. 
In addition, res judicata does not apply because USFSPA, the 
cause of action that allowed a spouse to seek a division of the 
military retirement a ::coi int, did not: exi st: at the time of the 
divorce. Res judicata only bars claims that were or could have 
been brought during the first case, not to future conditions or 
future claims. 
One oi the better cases to" decide thi.- issue is Powell v. 
Powell, 703 S.W.2d 434 (Texas App, 1985) Powell the coi n t 
dealt with a divorce in 1965 that was silent as to any division of 
the military retirement pay. The wife brought suit in 1979 seeking 
a judgment for 46% of the retirement. Thus, the wife (as in our 
case) waited fourteen years after the divorce to seek part of the 
military retirement pay. The trial court entered judgment for the 
wife for 46% of all retirement benefits and the husband appealed 
arguing res judicata. The appellate court followed McCarty and 
ruled that the wife was not entitled to anything. On February 1, 
1983, USFSPA was enacted and on April 7, 1983 the wife again filed 
for one-half (M) of the military retirement seeking a declaratory 
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judgment. The husband again asserted the defense of res judicata 
and argued that the wife was not entitled to one-half (M) of the 
military pay because it was not earned in a community property 
state, and the trial court took into account the military benefits 
in dividing the property and setting child support payments in the 
original decree. This time the trial court found that wife was 
entitled to 46% of the military retirement benefits, so the husband 
appealed again. The Powell court specifically held: 
Res judicata will operate as a bar only to matters 
actually raised or that could have been raised in the 
previous litigation. As to matters which arise 
subsequently, the prior judgment will not be res 
judicata. Our Supreme Court expresses the rule thusly: 
'The judgment is res judicata only of present and not 
future conditions' . - . (citations omitted) 
The enactment by congress of the FSPA created a new fact, 
a change in the law and a new cause of action. See also 
Muchard v. Berenson, 307 F.2d 368; State Farm Mutual Auto 
Ins. Co. v. Duel, 327 U.S. 154; U.S. v. Lubbock Ind. Sch. 
Dist. . 455 F.Supp. 1223; and-Colorado Co. FED. S&L Assn. 
v. Lewis CCA, 498 S.W.2d 723. Id. at 436 
Powell also held regarding the argument on community 
property vs. common law property at page 437: 
"We recognize that property acquired in common law 
jurisdictions has historically been termed separate property, 
but we hold that the property spouses acquire during marriage, 
except by gift, devise or descend should be divided upon 
divorce in Texas in the same manner as community property, 
irrespective of the domicile of the spouses where they acquire 
the property. Id. at 437. 
Utah would agree with this statement because it too divides 
all marital property acquired during marriage, regardless of whose 
name it was titled in or from what state it originated. 
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Regarding the Defendant's argument that other marital property 
and support was offset against the military retirement, the Powell 
court stated: 
"Appellant contends in his defense that the trial court 
took the military retirement benefits into consideration 
when dividing the parties' property and fixing child 
support payments cannot be adjudicated here by Summary 
Judgment. The military retired pay was not divided or 
mentioned in or by the divorce decree of 1965. Thus, the 
husband and wife became joint owners thereof." _Id. at 
437. 
Several cases, in addition to Powell, have held that res 
judicata is not a bar to a former spouse seeking one-half (M) of 
the retirement benefits. See generally Eddie v. Eddie, 7 -.2d 
783 (Texas 1986); Marino v. Alejandro, Jr., 775 S.W.2d 735 (Texas 
1989); Koepke v. Koepke, 732 S.W,2d 299 (Texas 1987); (wherein the 
court held that the doctrine nl " judicata did not bar a 
partition suit despite language in the Divorce Decree that stated 
"all relief requested in this case and not expressly granted herein 
is hereby denied" L>
 fiu^ die Decree did not expressly award the 
military retirement benefits to the service member); Casas v. 
Thompson, 720 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1986) (where, eleven years after 
divorce, wife is allowed to divide retirement that was silent in 
the Decree). 
The only cases which have permitted res judicata to bar an 
action for partition have been those where the court expressly 
awarded the military retirement benefits in the divorce decree. 
In the present case, the trial court did not expressly mention 
the military retirement benefits in the Decree of Divorce. The 
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divorce trial fits squarely within the time period after June 25, 
1981 (i.e., July 23, 1981 and July 9, 1982). The federal 
legislation made USFSPA retroactive to June 25, 1981. The property 
was not adjudicated and it remains in both parties as tenants in 
common. 
Regarding item 3 - whether there was a final judgment on the 
merits over the military retirement, there was not. The trial 
court specifically reserved jurisdiction to divide marital property 
later. Because of McCartyf the military retirement was initially 
treated as separate property of Mr. Toone but with the enactment of 
USFSPA on February 1, 1983, the effects of McCartv were eliminated 
and the retirement became marital property once again. The 
military retirement therefore was never divided by a final order of 
the court. Omission of certain property does not affect the 
finality of the Order as to property adjudicated, but on property 
not adjudicated, it remains held as tenants in common. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN APPLYING THE 
EIGHT-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO BAR APPELLANT'S 
CLAIM FOR A DIVISION OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT. 
The defense of statute of limitations is not applicable to 
this case, for several reasons: 
A. The former spouses are tenants in common to the 
retirement, no judgment was entered on its 
division and no ouster has occurred. 
Because the divorce court failed to divide the retirement, it 
remains marital property and is held as tenants in common. Several 
cases have decided the issue of omitted property in a decree of 
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divorce arid V w Hie property is held after the divorce. The 
majority, including Utah, have held that omitted property remains 
titled in both parties as tenai." J See generally Cooper 
v. Cooper, c, ..-.:.: ...j-i vAriz. Apt . ; •_? v Mosier v. Mosier, 830 
P.2d 1175 (Idaho 1992); Koepke v. Koepke, 732 S.W.2d (Texas 1987); 
Henn v. Henn, 6 05 P.2d ); lverson v. Iverson, 526 
P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974) (where the court found the parties who were 
previously joint tenants in a family home which the court did not 
fully divide would now become tenants in common to said home) ; see 
also Booth v. Booth, 722 P.2d 771 (Utah 1986) (similar holding). 
.. Obviously, if the parties could not adjudicate- ' he pr operty 
and the property w i, n 1 expressly divided in the Decree of 
Divorce, they must remain as tenants in common r the property 
since it was a marital asset that WHS iointly uwned during the 
marriage, Before the statute of* limitations or laches begins to 
run in a situation where both parties are tenants in common to the 
property, one party must oust the other one ?\i I ouster requires 
open, clear and hostile speech or acts that show a clear intent to 
exclude the other cotenant from the property. See Massey v. 
Protagro, 664 P. 2d 1176 (Utah 1983) (where the tax title statute of 
limitations and adverse possession limitation of seven years did 
not run against cotenant until other cotenant was ousted, merely 
waiting twenty (20) years or even ten . -ars after tax sale was 
not enough). 
Mr. Toone, who has the burden to show an ouster, has proffered 
no evidence that an ouster ever occurred in this case. The trial 
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court erroneously held that the limitations began on final divorce 
or when USFSPA was enacted in February 1983 . This was error since 
no ouster can take place by passage of a law or by silent, 
nondistribution in a divorce decree. Ouster requires much more as 
stated above. 
B. Statute of limitations is a legal defense and not 
applicable to this equitable claim. 
Because the retirement is held as tenants in common, a 
partition action is appropriate to divide the property. Partition 
actions are equitable proceedings. Likewise, the division of 
property in Utah in a divorce case is an equitable determination. 
Consequently, only equitable defenses are available to bar Mrs. 
Parkhurst's claim. Legal defenses, like the statute of 
limitations, do not apply to equitable claims. 
The doctrine of laches is an equitable defense which 
arises in cases where the^ plaintiff seeks equitable 
relief. A defendant may successfully assert this defense 
when a plaintiff seeking equity unreasonably delays in 
bringing an action and this delay prejudices the 
defendant. However, where the plaintiff's claims are 
based in law, the statute of limitations, not the 
doctrine of laches, governs the timing surrounding a 
plaintiff's filing of a complaint. See Doit, Inc. v. 
Touche, Ross & Company, 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996) 
Likewise, the doctrine of 1 aches, not statute of limitations, 
applies as a defense against the equitable claim of partition of 
the retirement. Otherwise, none of the ex-spouses in cases such as 
Henn, Casas, Powell, Id. (all from eleven to fourteen years after 
divorce) could have reopened the decree. 
C. Statute of limitations is not applicable because Congress 
expressly made USFSPA retroactive to June 25, 1981 by 
Amendment in November 1990. 
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Several cases have challenged the retroactive effect of 
USFSPA. In the majority, if not all of those decisions, the court 
has held that Congress intended that IJSFSP-' ippi y • et roactively. 
See generally In re: Marriage of Barnes, 743 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1987), 
and cases cited therein. The committee report accompanying the 
measure on USFSPA says: 
The purpose of this provision is to place the courts in 
the same position that they were in on June 26, 1981, the 
date of the McCarty decision, with respect to treatment 
of nondisability military retired or retainer pay. The 
provision is intended to remove the federal presumption 
found to exist by the United States Supreme Court and 
permit state and other courts of competent jurisdiction 
to apply pertinent state or other laws in determining 
whether military retired or retainer pay should be 
divisible. 
S. Rep. No. 502, 97th Cong. , 2d Sess. 16 (1982), 1:- * 
1555, 1611. " [T]he states interest in remedying the 'rank 
injustice' of the situation and in achieving an equitable 
dissolution of the marita1 relationshi p justi fies such ] : e11 oactive 
application." In re Marriage of Barnes, 743 P.2d 915 at page 918 
(Cal. 1987) . Congress amended § 1408(c) of USFSPA in November 1990 
to clarify that point and t » ill<>w lur modification back to June 
25, 1981. Because of the intended retroactive application, the 
statute of limitations cannot bar Mrs. Parkhurst's claim. 
D. The original Decree of Divorce reserved jurisdiction to 
decide future splits of property between the parties and 
that reservation avoids the statute of limitations 
problem. 
The Decree of Divorce dated July 23, 1981 states in paragraph 
2: "The court herein makes no order in respect to custody, child 
support or division property and that jurisdiction is retained 
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by the court to consider said matters at a later date." This 
specific reservation in the Decree retains by court order 
jurisdiction to consider division of any property at a later date. 
The statute of limitations cannot apply to such an order. This 
order would cover the military retirement benefits since that 
division of property has not yet taken place and jurisdiction was 
specifically reserved for it. Section (c) (1) (B) of 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1408 indicates that a spouse could even seek division of 
retirement before June 25, 1981 decrees if the divorce decree 
reserved jurisdiction to treat any amount of the retired pay of the 
member as property of the member and the member spouse or former 
spouse. The trial court also reserved jurisdiction in the 
Corrected Decree dated December 16, 1983, specifically at paragraph 
4 it states: "The court retains jurisdiction for a period of five 
(5) years at the expiration of which time either party may motion 
the court to revise due date of the loan or other property matters 
herein." This reservation of jurisdiction by the trial court would 
cover any property that the Corrected Judgment and Decree 
adjudicated, and would allow Mrs. Parkhurst to file a motion 
sometime after the expiration of five (5) years to deal with other 
property matters. Arguably, Mrs. Parkhurst's motion to partition 
the retirement filed in October 1995 was within the eight (8) year 
statute of limitations, if one was to be applied, because the five 
(5) years ended in December of 1988. 
Under either reservation of jurisdiction above, the court 
would have the authority to take another look at and divide the 
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military retirement, thus, omitting it from,, the operation of the 
statute of limitations and the cutoff provisions in USFSPA and 
leaving that issue open to be 1 itigated by (lie parties. 
E. The court has continuing jurisdiction to review property 
matters in Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-5 and the statute of 
limitations is not applicable in such situations. 
Utah law pi ov :i des tl lat a divorce court "has continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support in maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children 
and their support maintenance, health, dental care, or the 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary." Ut I! 30-3-5(3) (1953 as 
amended) (emphasis added). 
Other courts have also ruled that if there are marital assets 
which were not disposed iecree, tlleiI tlle court has 
continuing equitable power to divide those assets. See Elsworth v. 
Elsworth, 423 P.2d 364, 365 (Ariz. Ct. App. ] 967); In re: Marriage 
of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976); Cribbee v. McDermott, 521 P.2d 
1023 (Idaho 1974); Harris v. Harris, 493 P.2d 407 (N.M. 1972); 
Pittmann v. Pittmann, 393 P.2d 957 (Wash. 1964). 
The proper treatment of undisclosed and unlitigated property 
is that both parties become tenants in common of the property until 
the court can determine how the property is to be divided. Note 
that § 30-3-5 of * T^\' Code allows the court continuing 
jurisdiction to make "new orders" which we are asking the court to 
do in this case since McCartv created a new cause of action for 
Mrs. Parkhurst and she seeks a new order regarding the retirement. 
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Utah law further recognizes the court's authority to correct 
judgments at any time based on error or omission. Utah R. Civ. P. 
60 (a) . Other states have likewise recognized the theory of 
correction of a judgment to allow the court, where a husband's 
pension was omitted from the original findings and decree, to make 
a correction at any time. See In re the Marriage of Getz, 789 P. 2d 
331 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) based on a statute permitting correction 
of clerical errors under Rule 60 (a) which is very similar to the 
Utah rule. According to Getz, the rule provides that "clerical 
mistakes in judgments . . . and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected at any time . . . . Getz at 
332 (emphasis omitted). Utah's Rule 60(a) reads "clerical mistakes 
in judgments . . . arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative . . . " 
In Getz, the husband had two pensions, one state plan and one 
national plan, which was disclosed during discovery to the wife. 
The decree of divorce was later issued, dividing the assets of the 
state plan but was silent as to the national retirement plan. Wife 
requested a Nunc Pro Tunc order to modify the decree to include the 
national plan. The court found that the parties had intended to 
divide their assets and that the trial judge intended to divide all 
assets and allowed the division of the national plan through the 
Nunc Pro Tunc order. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court, at the time in which this divorce was 
granted, clearly recognized the trial court's continuing 
jurisdiction to make changes to orders regarding property 
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distribution, including modifying a spouse's interest in property 
consisting of a stream of payments and income which the parties had 
not yet received. In Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 
198 3), the court stated that "§ 30-3-5 does authorize the divorce 
court to reallocate property rights between the parties l the 
divorce, such as by modifying the earlier decree as to the parties 
interest in the Big Bear property, including installment payments 
not yet received." Id. at 186. 
Likewise, in this cast, retirement payments have not yet been 
received but soon will and the court can examine how to equitably 
divide this future stream of payments between the parties despite 
any contention regarding statute of limitations or a lapse of time 
since the decree of divorce. 
Mrs. Parkhurst will also show that a 
substantial change in circumstances has occurred to permit 
reopening of the Decree. 
III. LACHES CANNOT BE A DEFENSE IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT SO HELD AND NO HARM HAS OCCURRED TO MR TOONE. 
The trial court in Mrs. Parkhurst case ruled that laches and 
estoppel were not applicable (see Amended Order on Summary 
Judgment, page 4 paragraph 3) but then used equitable type 
arguments (similar to laches) to bar Mrs. Parkhurst's claim. This 
was err for several reasons. 
To make out a defense of laches, the plaintiff must show (1) 
that the defendant unreasonably delayed in bringing the action and 
(2) that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the delay. Bruer-
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Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 726 (Utah App. 1990) . A 
mere delay in time will not constitute laches. Therefore, even 
though the delay may be inexcusable and of a long duration (i.e., 
even exceeding the statute of limitations), if there is no 
prejudice to the other party that has issued from the mere passage 
of time then laches would not be a bar. In fact, for the doctrine 
of laches to apply to a suit for the partition of personal property 
such as military retirement pay, there must be evidence of a 
repudiation of the partitioning cotenant's interest in the property 
by the other cotenant. See Bankston v. Taft, 612 SW 2d 216 
(Texas). 
In Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P. 2d 528 (Utah 1943) , it was held 
that mere delay is not enough. One critical element of laches is 
knowledge of essential facts. In Openshaw, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that laches cannot be imputed to one who was ignorant of the 
facts and for that reason failed to assert his rights. Jd. at 531. 
Laches requires subjective, actual knowledge. It was error for the 
trial court to impute knowledge of USFSPA to Mrs. Parkhurst, when 
she had no actual knowledge of it. 
In addition, laches requires an unreasonable delay in 
commencing an action after obtaining actual knowledge. As stated 
above, a mere lapse of time is not enough. There must be evidence 
that Mrs. Parkhurst actually delayed filing for partition, after 
actually learning she could do so which delay was inexcusable. The 
only evidence presented was that Mrs. Parkhurst filed her claim 
soon after learning of her rights under USFSPA. 
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Finally, loi 1 lie defense of laches to bar an action, there 
must be damage to Mr. Toone resulting from the unreasonable delay. 
As stated in Openshaw: 
Laches is more than a mere lapse of time, its essence is 
estoppel. While delay is an important factor, yet mere 
delay, unless unreasonable or inexcusable, is not enough; 
and of an equal importance are the circumstances 
occurring during the delay, the relationship of the 
parties to the subject, disadvantages, that may have come 
through loss of evidence, change of title, intervention 
of equities, or injury from other causes. Id. 
Cases involving military retirement pay and laches have made 
it clear that laches does not apply to retirement benefits that 
will be received prospectively because there is no prejudice to the 
service member. The service member has no right to control the 
retirement until it is received ana z--. •,,anjiot assign or transfer 
their property interest. The court in Beltran v. Razo, 788 P.2d 
1256 (Ariz. App. 1990), so held. Another case decided subsequent 
to Beltran is Flynn v. Rogers, 834 I1, ci i in (Ail/ , 1992). In 
Flynn, the husband had retired from the military and was collecting 
retirement at the time the couple divorced. The wife was told by 
a friend about USFSPA six and one-half (6M) years after its 
enactment. She then filed for a partition of the military 
retirement benefits. The court found that USFSPA created a new 
fact and the passage of the law should imputed to her for 
purposes of laches. Consequently, the court found that laches did 
not bar her claim to a retroactive award of $35,00u.00 +-h«r- , 
already been received by her ex-husband and was not a defense at 
all to a prospective claim to future retirement benefits. The 
court reasoned as follows: 
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Here, by contrast, the wife did not learn of any such 
'fact' after the filing of the dissolution decree. 
Assuming that the 'fact' giving rise to the wife's claim 
was the husband's receipt of pension benefits, the wife 
had knowledge of that fact before the decree was entered, 
at which time, under McCarty, she had no claim. On the 
other hand, if the inception of rights flowing from the 
enactment of FSPA could possibly be considered a xfact', 
then laches should not defeat her claim because the trial 
court found, upon consideration of the evidence, that she 
had no knowledge of that xfact' until shortly before the 
commencement of this proceeding. JEd. at 153. 
The court found that the wife's prior knowledge of the 'fact' 
of the husband's receipt of military pension benefits could not, 
and did not, give rise to a claim on her part. Rather, her claim 
evolved from rights created by the passage of USFSPA, and the trial 
court found that she had no knowledge of those rights until shortly 
before she commenced the proceeding. In Flynn the court refused to 
impute knowledge to the wife or state that her ignorance of the law 
was inexcusable. 
As the court stated in Beltran v. Razo, 788 P. 2d 1256, (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1990) , "equity does not encourage laches, and the doctrine 
may not be invoked to defeat justice but only to prevent 
injustice." Id. at 1258. 
In the present case, Mr. Toone has not received or spent any 
of the retirement benefits. They are not due to be received until 
1998. Laches cannot be used as an argument to stop Mrs. Parkhurst 
from receiving her entitled one-half (M) share to these retirement 
benefits. There has been no injustice created to Mr. Toone and 
justice demands that Mrs. Parkhurst receive her fair share of these 
retirement benefits. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING NO CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED JUSTIFYING REOPENING THE DECREE 
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY RETAINED JURISDICTION 
TO DIVIDE THE MARITAL PROPERTY IN THIS CASE AT A LATER 
DATE, HAD CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO DO SO BY STATUTE, 
AND A NEW CLAIM AROSE BECAUSE OF THE ENACTMENT OF USFSPA 
WHICH WAS CLEARLY A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE CREATED BY 
STATUTORY ENACTMENT. 
This Court's holding in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P. 2d 
121 (Utah App. Court 1988), can clearly be distinguished from the 
instant case because a substantial change in circumstances can be 
shown, thus permitting the court to reopen the divorce and divide 
the military retirement. 
The Court's decision in Throckmorton, cited by Mr. Toone as 
authority for granting Mr. Toone's motion for summary judgment, was 
based on an entirely different legal claim and set of circumstances 
which have substantial.factual distinction from the instant case. 
Throckmorton involved parties who divorced in September 1976, 
five (5) years before the effective date of USFSPA and therefore 
clearly outside of the gap period created by McCarty. In the 
present case, the divorce was granted after the effective date of 
June 25, 1981 created by USFSPA and is given retroactive effect by 
USFSPA to that time. 
Throckmorton also involved a request to modify 1976 divorce 
decree, regarding a pension fund upon which the divorce decree was 
silent, on the main theory that a subsequent change in law by 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) created a 
"substantial change in circumstances". The Court in Throckmorton 
relied heavily, if not entirely, on the principle that Woodward 
would not have retroactive effect and could only be applied 
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prospectively and therefore could not constitute a substantial 
change in circumstances to divorces prior to Woodward. However, in 
Mrs. Parkhurst's case, the divorce decree was actually finalized in 
December 1983, after Woodward became law, and therefore a 
substantial change in circumstances could be created by Woodward as 
well as USFSPA allowing this court to retroactively adjust the 
military retirement benefits. Congress clearly intended to create 
a new cause of action for cases that fell after June 25, 1981. 
Throckmorton also held "that the legal recognition of a new 
category of property rights after a decree of divorce has been 
entered, is not itself sufficient to establish a substantial change 
in circumstances justifying a re-evaluation of the prior property 
division", but did not restrict itself if other facts that would 
also indicate that a substantial change in circumstances exist. 
See Throckmorton at 124. In Throckmorton, the court found that 
under the totality of the circumstances, the property distribution 
does not offend our sense of justice. .Id. at 124. Mr. 
Throckmorton was ordered to pay $12,000.00 in marital debt in the 
original decree, and Mrs. Throckmorton was awarded the family home 
and ultimately received $24,000.00 in equity and had her alimony 
increased. In addition, the trial court in Throckmorton found that 
the former spouse had an opportunity to litigate retirement issues 
during the first proceeding. After looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, Throckmorton decided there was no substantial change 
in circumstances. Id. 123 
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However, Mrs. Parkhurst, in the current case, had no 
opportunity to litigate the division of the military retirement at 
the first trial. Furthermore, because the trial court in Mrs. 
Parkhurst's case divided all other martial property 50/50, she 
received no offsetting child support or alimony, and due to the 
recognition of a new category of property rights by USFSPA and the 
windfall that Mr. Toone would receive if he were allowed one 
hundred percent (100%) of those military retirement benefits a 
substantial change of circumstances does exist justifying the 
reopening of the decree. 
Lastly, Throckmorton as well as Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P. 2d 713 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), which followed Throckmorton were both based 
on divorce cases involving omitted retirement benefits for divorces 
granted prior to 1981 (i.e., Throckmorton 1976 and Ostler 1978) and 
did not involve military retirement, which was specifically 
excluded by McCarty from being considered in the divorce. As 
stated in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), the divorce court is to consider all marital property when 
making an equitable distribution unless the law specifically 
prevents the court from considering a particular asset. Id. at 
837. Because the retirement funds in Throckmorton and Ostler could 
have been considered by the trial court and no law prevented their 
consideration, the court specifically found that the matters were 
res judicata. However, in Mrs. Parkhurst's case, federal law and 
the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of that law in McCarty 
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specifically prevented the trial court from considering the 
military retirement. 
In Mrs. Parkhurst's case, the military retirement was not 
previously litigated or incorporated in the Decree and she can now 
attack the original Decree and seek a new order regarding the same. 
V. THE NAVAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT EARNED DURING THE MARRIAGE 
FROM MARCH, 1958 THROUGH THE END OF 1979 IS CONSIDERED 
MARITAL PROPERTY UNDER UTAH LAW AND CAPABLE OF DIVISION 
DURING THE DIVORCE TRIAL IN JULY OF 1982 WERE IT NOT FOR 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN MCCARTY, WHICH STATED 
FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTED APPLICATION OF STATE MARITAL 
PROPERTY CONCEPTS TO MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
USFSPA 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) (1), provides in part: 
(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court 
may treat disposable retired pay payable to a member for 
pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as 
property solely of the member or as property of the 
member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the 
jurisdiction of such court. 
This provision specifically provides that a court may treat the 
retired pay as property of the member and the former spouse for all 
divorces occurring after June 25, 1981, in accordance with the law 
of the jurisdiction of the court. The status of Utah law regarding 
the division of retirement on June 25, 1981 is found in the 
Encrlert, Bennett, and Dogu decisions which defined the divisibility 
of retirement prior to Woodward. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Encrlert v. Encrlert, 576 P. 2d 1274 
(Utah 1978), defined retirement benefits to be included under § 30-
3-5 and divisible by the courts. Jd. at 1276. The defendant in 
that case argued that his veterans retirement fund was not property 
within the meaning of the statute and should not be considered in 
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the property divis ion. Id. at 1275. The defendant cited In re: 
Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1975), where the 
Colorado Court of Appeals held: "that the husband's army retirement 
pension and future retired pay to be received thereunder do not 
constitute "property" and are, therefore, not subject to division 
under the Colorado statute." Defendant also argued in that case 
that since Utah was not a community property state and only 
community property states had recognized military retirement funds 
and pensions which accrued during the marriage as subject to 
division. Accordingly, defendant said that Utah should not uphold 
the rulings in the community property states. JEd. 1275-76. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court in Englert defined § 30-3-5, 
which states "when a decree of divorce is made, the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property and parties, and 
the maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable", 
to contain general terms and no hint of a limitation. The court 
said: 
The import of our decisions implementing that statute is 
that proceedings in regard to the family are equitable in 
a high degree; and that the court may take into 
consideration all of the pertinent circumstances. It is 
our opinion that the correct view under our law is that 
this encompasses all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived; and that this includes any such 
pension fund or insurance. 
Id. at 1276. 
Utah law recognized in Englert that the military retirement 
benefits provided by the Veterans Hospital were a divisible asset 
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under Utah law and followed the position of community property 
states who held likewise. 
In Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d 839 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court also considered the division of a husband's military 
retirement fund contributed by the federal government while he was 
employed at Hill Air Force Base. In Bennett, a civilian personnel 
officer testified at the time of the divorce hearing that the 
present value of the husband's retirement fund was $15,681.95. She 
further stated that the federal government had contributed the same 
amount to his retirement fund but that no present value could be 
assigned to that portion. Id. at 840. The court followed the 
language in Englert and divided the husbatid's contributions to his 
retirement, but held that because the contributions by the federal 
government had no present value and may not have any value in the 
future, that it was err for the^ district court to consider the 
federal contribution to the retirement as one of the assets of the 
parties. Chief Justice Crockett dissented from the majority 
opinion and said he was in hardy agreement with the quote from the 
Englert case and stated that the court should include anything that 
is realistic and substantial, even ari expectancy of future 
retirement funds. Id. at 841. 
The next Utah case dealing ^ith division of retirements ^as 
Dogu v._Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982). In Dogu the husband 
argued that since none of his separate retirement funds could be 
withdrawn until he retired, the total value of those funds, 
$86,730.00, should not be subject to division between the parties 
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even though they were all accumulated during the marriage. Id. at 
1309-11. The Dogu court considered the decision in both Bennett 
and Englert and ruled that the Bennett case reflected a failure of 
proof on present value and still included the marital property 
portion of the husband's retirement, even though he had not yet 
retired or received the actual enjoyment of his retirement benefits 
which were purely prospective. Id. The Dogu court then held that 
it is the trial court's duty to make an equitable division of 
property in a divorce action which includes assets of every nature, 
including pension funds. Id. In Dogu the court divided the 
$86,73 0.00 of retirement and considered the entire amount a marital 
asset. The Court also suggested several methods for making that 
division: (1) The court could order that respondent elect a join 
and survivor annuity under each retirement fund or that is an 
option, with appropriate adjustments to his alimony obligation 
during the period following retirement; (2) If respondent's 
retirement rights permit this option, the court could order that 
respondent elect that upon his retirement appellant be paid, in 
lieu of alimony after retirement, a lump sum equal to one-half (H) 
the value of the retirement benefit as of the date of divorce, plus 
investment income accumulated thereafter; (3) The court might 
order that appellant's rights to alimony continue after 
respondent's death or up until her own death or remarriage. Id. 
The court recognized that each of the foregoing alternatives 
assumed that the respondent would live long enough to retire. The 
Poena court also provided for the eventuality if the respondent dies 
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before retirement. If respondent is awarded full ownership of the 
retirement funds, the court could order that upon his death before 
retirement the commuted value of appellant's post-retirement 
alimony for the period of her life expectancy be a claim against 
respondent's estate or, in the alternative, if respondent's 
retirement rights permit this option, it could also order that 
respondent elect that upon his death prior to retirement, appellant 
be paid the cash value of one-half (M) of the retirement right as 
of the date of the divorce, plus investment income accumulated 
thereafter. Id. The court recognized that there may also be other 
alternatives. The court stated "in any case, the district court 
may require additional evidence on the nature of the retirement 
funds and the needs and preferences of the parties in order to 
exercise its statutory power to divide the retirement funds 
equitably." Id. at 1311. 
These three cases define the scope of the law as it existed in 
Utah during 1981 and 1982 when Mrs. Parkhurst divorced Mr. Toone. 
These cases indicate the trial court does have a right to look at 
the military retirement benefits and make decisions regarding its 
equitable division. Later Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431 (Utah 
1982) overruled the holding in Bennett, followed the Dogu decision 
and upheld the Englert decision and stated that it is not necessary 
to consider whether pension rights are vested or nonvested. Id. 
432-33. The court specifically said it had the right to divide any 
retirement benefits even though they are in a form of deferred 
compensation by the employer. Ld. The main consideration is 
40 
whether those rights accrued during the marriage, and if so, then 
the court must at least consider those benefits in making an 
equitable distribution of the marital assets. It is interesting to 
note that Woodward upheld the trial court's decision which divided 
a civilian retirement benefit. The Woodward trial took place at 
approximately the same time as the trial in the Parkhurst-Toone 
matter. 
Subsequent cases dealing with military retirement benefits 
acquired in whole or in part during the marriage have been found to 
constitute marital property under Utah law and are subject to 
division. In Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
the Utah Supreme Court again stated "the essential criteria is 
whether the right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or 
in part during the marriage." Id. at 831. The court in Greene 
concluded that under Utah case law, marital property encompasses 
all types of retirement funds and any retirement fund that accrued 
in whole or in part during the marriage may be distributed in a 
divorce proceeding. JEd. The Greene case and all subsequent Utah 
cases have relied heavily on the statement in Englert that "marital 
property encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by 
the parties whenever obtained and from whatever source derived; and 
this includes any such pension fund or insurance." Id. 
Mrs. Parkhurst had a right to share in the military retirement 
benefits earned during her marriage to Mr. Toone. Utah recognized 
that right in 1981 and 1982 when this matter went to trial. 
However, because of the McCarty decision of June 25, 1981, the 
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trial court did not have authority to divide the military benefits 
at that time and the military retirement benefits were omitted from 
the trial court Findings and were not considered. USFSPA 
eliminated the effects of McCarty and permitted retroactive 
divisions of military retirement benefits for all divorces which 
happened after June 25, 1981. Because this divorce happened after 
June 25, 1981, and because Utah law recognized the right to divide 
all marital assets of whatever nature from whatever source, the 
court should now consider dividing the military retirement in this 
case. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT DENIED 
MRS. PARKHURST'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO EQUITABLY 
DIVIDE THE MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS PARTICULARLY WHEN 
ALL OTHER MARITAL PROPERTY HAD BEEN DIVIDED ON -A~50/50 
BASIS AND WHERE MRS. PARKHURST DID NOT RECEIVE ANY 
ALIMONY IN LIEU OF THE RETIREMENT, AND WHERE THE MILITARY 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS HAVE NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED OR PAID TO 
EITHER PARTY. 
Review of the Findings of Fact and the Corrected Decree 
relative to the property distribution in this case makes it clear 
that the trial court's intent was to divide the property equally 
between the parties. The trial court decision addresses Mr. 
Toone's Utah State retirement and Mrs. Parkhurst's Utah State 
retirement plans but is silent on the question of Mr. Toone's naval 
retirement. The court intended to split the retirements equally 
when it valued Mr. Toone's civil retirement at roughly $10,000.00 
and Mrs. Parkhurst's Utah State retirement at roughly $3,000.00. 
The court awarded Mrs. Parkhurst $3,500.00 (i.e., one-half (M) of 
the difference of $7,000.00) in other property to make up for the 
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difference in retirement division. The trial court also divided 
other marital property between the parties on a 50/50 basis 
pursuant to Exhibit "A, " which was attached to the Decree of 
Divorce and valued every personal property item between the 
parties. The court specifically equalized the property on Exhibit 
"A, " which was awarded to Mr. Toone at $5,766.00 and the items 
awarded to Mrs. Parkhurst at $8,017.00 by giving offsets and 
adjustments in paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce so that both 
parties received $35,586.75 in total equity in the marital estate. 
The only other asset was a parcel of property which was awarded 
equally to both parties as tenants in common and was to be sold 
later and the proceeds equitably divided. In fact, the parties 
sold that parcel of property on April 1995 and divided the same. 
Mrs. Parkhurst was not awarded any alimony except for $1.00 a year 
in paragraph 13 of the Divorce Decree, and Mr. Toone never paid any 
of that alimony. 
Consequently, the Findings and the Decree in the original 
property division make it clear that the court divided what 
property was before it on a 50/50 basis. This court should 
continue with this trend and permit Mrs. Parkhurst her rightful 
equitable share of the military retirement so that justice is 
created and an inequity avoided. If Mr. Toone is to receive one 
hundred percent (100%) of the retirement he will receive a windfall 
that was not intended. 
The recent cases of Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P. 2d 830 (Utah App. 
1987) and Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
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both held that it may be more equitable to distribute retirement 
benefits that are difficult to value later, rather than at the time 
of divorce. Marchant dealt with a federal retirement plan. The 
court in Bailey reasoned that postponing the distribution equalizes 
the risk and the benefits to both parties. "Not only is postponed 
distribution generally fair, it also allows the asset to be used by 
both parties in a way and at a time the asset was intended to be 
used, that is 'for retirement' " . Id. at 832. The Bailey court 
specifically found the trial court retains the discretion to divide 
retirement account along with other assets and if it chooses to 
divide the retirement at the date of divorce, it must make specific 
findings as to reasons for immediate distribution. Otherwise, the 
distribution of retirement benefits should generally be postponed 
until the benefits are received. JEd. at 833. 
There is no reason why the Court in this case should not do 
likewise. There is a strong indication that the trial court 
divided all marital property 50/50 that was before it. The 
military retirement which was not before the court and could not be 
because of existing law, was a military retirement which could have 
been easily postponed for distribution later. By allowing Mrs. 
Parkhurst to now equitably divide that military retirement at the 
date and time that it was intended to be used for retirement is in 
line with the public policy and methodology provided in Marchant 
and Bailey. 
The fact that the military retirement was not expressly placed 
in the Findings and Decree of Divorce by Mr. Toone, whose attorney 
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was supposed to draft the Decree and Order, likewise prohibits him 
from arguing that he was, in fact, awarded one hundred percent 
(100%) of that retirement pay. Under this logic, res judicata bars 
Mr. Toone's claim that he is entitled to all of the military 
retirement benefits since McCartv did not prevent Mr. Toone from at 
least asking the court to make an express award of the retirement 
to him; it only prevented its division between the parties. Mr. 
Toone's failure to raise his claim to one hundred percent (100%) of 
the military retirement benefits at the time of divorce should bar 
his attempt to make that claim now. 
The Memorandum Decision regarding the Summary Judgment Order 
was based in large part on the assumption that the trial court must 
have taken into account the military retirement benefits and if the 
court now allowed Mrs. Parkhurst to receive some share of those 
benefits, all other issues regarding division of property would 
have to be relitigated. That assumption was made in error and was 
not correct. The trial court divided all of the other marital 
property 50/50 and totally omitted the military retirement. Using 
the logic of the trial judge to award Mr. Toone one hundred percent 
(100%) of that military retirement would now be an injustice to 
Mrs. Parkhurst since she did not receive one-half (M) of that 
benefit. 
WHEREFORE, Mrs. Parkhurst respectfully requests this Court to 
find that the trial court erred and that she is, in fact, entitled 
to one-half (M) of the future military retirement benefits. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the facts and law before the Court clearly show 
that the parties not only omitted the military retirement benefit 
from the property division and that no express mention or findings 
were issued regarding the military retirement, but also that 
McCarty and Woodward, did not: allow for actual division or 
litigation on that issue. As such the military retirement was not 
adjudicated, nor could it have been adjudicated. Mrs. Parkhurst is 
entitled to have that property divided now. 
Mrs. Parkhurst is entitled to be treated fairly and equitably 
in this matter. The principles of equity outrule and outweigh the 
need for finality in this case. Public policy in Utah favors 
division of military retirement benefits at the time they are to be 
received by the parties. In the limited context of omitted assets 
in a divorce, public policy favoring the equitable division of 
marital property outweighs the need for the stability and finality 
of judgments. 
WHEREFORE, Mrs. Parkhurst requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court on Mr. Toone's Motion for Summary Judgment and reverse 
the decision on Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 
and hereby asks the Court to either remand the case back to the 
trial court for further decision consistent with the opinion of the 
Appellate Court or to deny Mr. Toone's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and grant Mrs. Parkhurst's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law. 
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DATED this 9th day of June, 1997. 
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Exhibit A 
Robert D. Atwood 
A t t o r n e y f o r P I a i n t i f f 
ZOLLINGER & ATWOOD 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
256 NORTH FIRST WEST 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
(801) 753.0012 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
LYNN VINCENT TOONE, * 
Plaintiff, * DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. * 
RUBY JOAN TOONE, * CIVIL HO. 19707 
Defendant. * 
This matter was heard on the 20th day of July, 
1981, before the Honorable Omer J. Call, District Judge; the 
Plaintiff was present in person and represented by his 
attorney, Robert D. Atwood, of Zollinger & Atwood. The 
Defendant, and her attorney, David W. Sorenson, did not 
appear. The parties have agreed that Plaintiff may proceed on his 
motion to shorten time. Upon conclusion of the hearing and the 
Court having heard the testimony and having examined the 
evidence and being fully advised in the premises and having 
theretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now makes and enters the following judgment and 
Decree. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Plaintiff, LYNN VINCENT TOONE, be and 
he is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, 
RUBY JOAN TOONE, the same to become final upon signing of 
the Decree by the Court. 
2. That the Court herein makes no order in respect 
to custody, child support or division of property and that 
jurisdiction is retained by the Court to consider said 
matters at a later date. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of v W ^ 1981. 
J / W707-6> 
UiMhi/yvn/iA-
- 2 -
BY THE COURT 
/ 7[ 
/-: 
Omar J Call, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Decree of Divorce was mailed, postpaid, to the 
Defendant's attorney, David W Sorenson at 56 W Center, 
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P B O C E E D ^ N G S . 
THE COURT: As to the personal items that are on 
the list that has been submitted as exhibits D-5 and -6 and i 
plaintiffs one, this is pretty much the only evidence I 
not | 
have as to their worth, is what the parties say, so I'm/going, 
to take the time here to go through each item, but I'll 
start out the list and tell you what I would do if we spent 
all afternoon in here doing it. 
For example, the camper, value by the plaintiff 
six, value by the defendant at 450. Split the difference is 
525. Truck would be 200 and—by the defendant, and 500 by 
the plaintiff. There's a difference; a split would be 350, 
to arrive at a final value. And you can go through that on 
each item and get a final value list. *** Therefs one item 
I guess on exhibit six, the first item m the possession of 
Lynn, he doesn't have a value on the '80 Plymouth. She has 
$5,460. I think that has to be treated separately. 
MR. SORENSON: All right. Your honor, to be abso-
lutely candid with the court on that, and I can tell counsel 
this, we've shown that as an f81 Plymouth Champ because she 
thought it was an '81. The testimony today comes out as a 
1980. Those figures were arrived at by calling Alan Palmer 
at Palmer's Motor to get the figures, and we'd just have to 













what that would b e — 
THE: COURT: Well, I'ca^tell you, if, you want to 
figure it out to give a value, i$
 t h a t you get what the l o w — 
the difference, or the middle difference between low and high 
book and subtract the balance du^
 ancj give the equity bal-
ance and then allot that figure. | 
MR. SORENSON; Fine. tye«d accept that. | 
THE COURT: Okay. Now
 a s t o those items such as — 
that he wanted—the computer and the electrical parts, grill, 
s h e w m t e d the camp stand, cooler chest w h i c h — s o m e of them 
you both indicated a willingness
 t o make t h e exchange. Those, 
that you are, using the same mett\od 0 f value, you just switch 
1 
13 it as to who gets the total valu^ if you're willing to ex-
change them. If,you 0re not, I'm
 n o t going to get into any 14 
15 kind of a hassle about forcing ar\ exchange. 
16 | MR. SORENSON: Can we ^ 0 through those items one 
17
 ] by one, the computer? 
18 !
 MR. LAURITZEN: We can
 d o that. I think counsel 
19
 | can do that, can't we? 
20 I THE COURT: Yeah. The
 o n l y o n e that I have that 
would be different t}?<?£ you dos?*b already have in your notes , 
would be the question on the p e r s o n a i p a p e r s , and this doesn 
23 I attach any value at all, it's siit\piy a m atter of access to 
24 J make copies, and I would say he Should be entitled to do 




can't arrive at at least ,a total .figure that each receives 
on the personal-fi1tems: under, the method I've outlined, withoutf 
MR. SORENSON: No, we'd accept the court's method 
of handling that. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Then once you reach a total on 
those values and who has what, you can reach a total value 
as to—one may come out say $5,000 worth of stuff and another 
seven, so you have a difference. One is getting more than 
the other. We'll just say for example ** that the plaintiff 
has $3,000 more than the defendant he receives by way of 
personal property. We'll just keep that as an example. ** 
One thing that I'm really not sure about, and that's on this 
for example Willis's appraisal says Tract Two at $2,800. ** 
Would it be possible for you both to agree as to that partic-
ular parcel, to go ahead through a sale and split it? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Yeah, that's what we'd do. 
MR. SORENSON: She'd agree. 
THE COURT: Why don't we say as to parcel two it 
will be sold and after the costs of sale that the parties 
split the proceeds equally. Then we don't need to worry 
about plugging a speculative figure in there. ** Now the 
other parcel I assume is in the possession of the plaintiff. 
Again there8s a difference, one being 76,000 in round figures 
as opposed to 82,500. ** So taking into account the differ-



























the 75, I'll put -that ati BO. . ** <And I will make that total 
labor and materials at a value x>f -$3,000. ** What I'm saying 
is I think the principle is the same whether it's 3,000 or 
a hundred thousand. But first of all we take the 80,000 
mortgage 
figure, and then I don't know what the/balance is today. 
MR. SORENSON: ** As of 7-1-82 a printout shows 
$25,489.76. 
** THE COURT: Take that $25,489, make it 490, what 
do you get, 54,510? 
MR. SORENSON: Are you taking it from the 80,000 
or from the 77,000? 
THE COURT: 80. 
MR. SORENSON: Okay. 54,510. 
THE COURT: I think that half of that is $27,255. 
You take those as two base figures then to start with. Now 
on the retirement, his is ten, hers is three. ** She's 
entitled to half of his, which is $5,000, he's entitled to 
half of hers, which is 1,500. She keeps her three, he keeps 
his ten, but then he'd owe her $3,500. So she'd have a full 
credit of $3,500 to be added on to her $27,255. Well, we 
got to do it another way. As I said, this goes as a credit 
to her, he gets a credit of three on what I think he's im-
proved after the divorce that adds to the value of the house. 
So on the retirement she has a $3,500 credit, he has a 3,000. 
You'll have to adjust it so that the credits adjust out what 
1 she's going to have finally either added or deducted to this 
2 $27,255. She already gets that as half of the property, and 
3 this is the one with the house on it. The other one they're 
4
 going to sell. ** Now then, you arrive at another credit, 
5 but I donft know what this figure is going to be, and that is 
6
 why I gave you this example: Suppose it comes out that he 
7 has 3,000 more of the personal than she does, so he's got 
8 $3,000 more that she's entitled to half of as far as value 
9 is concerned, so that would give her an additional 1,500 
10 credit. ** 
11 MR. SORENSON: And that's something that counsel 
12 will have to work out, I'm assuming. Not going to take the 
13 time today to go through each one. 
14 THE COURT: Yeah, to get that figure. I'm not 
15 sure what that will be, but I'm assuming $1,500 just for the 
16 purposes of—and she would also have $3,500 on the retire-
17 merit, which is now fixed. That would give her 5,000 credits 
18 and the plaintiff three, so she's got an extra two coming. 
19 So you take the 27,255 and that would make 29,255 and then 
20 you take his credit for the equity in the house and take the 
21 two from that, so his would be 29,255. Does that make any 
22 sense, so you still come up with the 8,000 when you add 
23 them? 
24 MR. SORENSON: Yes. We can see what the shift is 
25
 there. You're just adding a bigger lien and bigger credit 
-7-
1 against the property. 
2 THE COURT: Yes* Because I think when you balance 
3
 all of these credits you're going to have to make it a lien 
4
 of that figure against'the property. ** So after you work 
5 out this personal property thing, and say she does have a 
6 lien then against the house of $29,250, that the lien is now 
7 due and payable, except that I understand, Ifm sure that he 
8 cannot come up with, tomorrow, 29,000 whatever it is. So she 
9 will have a note for that much at present legal interest. ** 
10 I think it's twelve per cent. But it's in the statute. 
11 MR. LAURITZEN: Or can he in the alternative give 
12 her the house and let her pay it? 
13 THE COURT: Well, either that or sell it. 
14 **^MR. SORENSON: According to Bruce Jorgensen, 
15 your honor, on 29,000 even at twelve per cent, $319.31 a 
16 month. ** 
17 THE COURT: Okay, I'll make it a 20-year loan, 
18 legal rate, and pay that monthly figure. Now I have a prob- ' 
I 
19 I lem with the balloon figure at this time because you get 
20 into so much speculation of what his situation is going to 
21 be in five years, but I will reserve jurisdiction under that 
22 provision under the statute where the court can reserve juris-f-
23 diction on custody and property settlement, to undertake any 
24 motions at the five-year period to see what should be done on 
25 it. 
1 As to alimony, ** I'll make a dollar a year alimony 
2 provision- ** As to child support, I will have the defendant 
3 contribute to the support of her daughter in the amount of 
4 $50.00 a month, which may be deducted from the monthly pay-
5 ment. And as to attorney's fees, that he contribute toward 
6 her attorney's fees ** based on the fractional difference 
7 in their income ** the amount of $275.00 plus costs. 
8 ** If he still has the insurance in force, the 
9 minor children be kept on as beneficiaries for at least half 
10 of the value. ** If you can get the cash value that's 
11 satisfactory with Mr. Lauritzen that you have a correct fig-
12 ure, she can have a credit again to be fixed like we were 
13 shown here of credits, of one-half. 
14 MR. SORENSON: As of July, 1982, there's $4,698.50 
15 on the Beneficial Life policy. 
16 THE COURT: If you can satisfy Mr. Lauritzen that 
17 that's correct and there's nothing wrong with it, she'd have 









David W. Sorenson 
OLSON, HOGGAN & SORENSON 
Attorneys at Law 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
LYNN VINCENT TOONE, ] 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ] 




I JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
i Civil No. 19707 
This matter came on for hearing on the 9th day of July, 1982 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen 
presiding. The Plaintiff was present in person and was 
represented by his attorney, A.W. Lauritzen; the Defendant was 
present and was represented by her attorneys, Olson, Hoggan & 
Sorenson, David W. Sorenson. The parties were sworn and testified 
and documents having been presented and admitted into Court, and 
the Court having granted a divorce in this action on the 20th day 
of July, 1981, reserving until this time to hearing the matter of 
property settlement, the Court having made its decision at the 
conclusion of the hearing from the Bench, and the Court having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being 
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1. The items of personal property awarded to the Plaintiff 
are incorporated in Schedule lfAfl attached hereto and have a value 
of $5,766.00; the items of personal property awarded to the 
Defendant are incorporated in Schedule ffAn attached hereto and 
have a value of $8,017.00. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the 1980 Plymouth Champ automobile 
subject to the indebtedness thereon. There exists a difference 
between the value and the indebtedness on said vehicle in the 
amount of $618.00 as of July 20, 1982. 
3. The parties own the following parcels of real 
property: 
Parcel 1 
All of that part of Lots 3 and 4, Block 2, Plat "B" Richmond 
City Survey lying West: of the canal and described as: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 4, said Block 2, and 
running thence East 225 feet, more or less to the 
right-of-way line of the canal; thence Southwesterly along 
the right-of-way line of said canal, to the West line of Lot 
4; thence North 245 feet, more or less, along the West line 
of said Lot 4 to point of beginning. Containing 0.63 acre 
more or less. 
Parcel 2 (Home) 
Part of the West half of Section 7 described as follows and 
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 7 as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1328.25 feet by measurement (1320 feet 
by record) and 125 feet East of the Northwest corner of the 
Southwest quarter of said Section 7, and running thence South 
239.85 feet; thence South 79°18' East 549 feet to the High 
Creek Canyon Road; thence North 21°24f East 200 feet; thence 
North 79°17,30n West 207.2 feet; thence North 4°53' East 
129.7 feet; thence North 75°45f West 464 feet; thence South 
88.2 feet to point of beginning, and further described as 
being situate in Township 14 North, Range 1 and 2 East of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
4. Each of the parties are awarded one-half (1/2) the equity 
& SORENSOT of the home, $27,255.00 subject to adjustment for values of other 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW . _ • i j , •
 n 1 . . - - . - , 1 1 1 56 WEST CENTER 11ems as e 1 sewhere provided herein. Plaintiff is awarded the home 
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(Parcel 2, paragraph 3 herein) subject to any and all 
indebtedness thereon and a lien in favor of Defendant in the sum 
of $32,505.29 (equity of $27,569.75 plus interest of $4,935.54), 
which Defendant is hereby awarded and, which is now due and 
payable, which lien includes $4,935.54 interest at the rate of 
twelve percent (12%) per annum from July 9, 1982, the date of the 
hearing to December 31, 1983, and payable monthly over a period of 
twenty (20) years, payments to commence on January 1, 1984 in the 
sum of $357.85 and $357.85 on the 1st day of each month thereafter 
until January 1, 2004, on which date the entire unpaid balance of 
principal and interest to be paid. Said sum shall bear intere#£-^ 
at 12% per annum from January 1, 1984 until paid. The/Court ^^ fc-^ -
retains jurisdiction for a period of five (5) years -dre^ B^ - which cw 
time either party may motion the Court to revise due date of the 
loan or other property matters herein. 
5. Parcel 1, as described in paragraph 3 is awarded equally 
to the two parties as tenants in common and is to be sold and 
after the costs of sale, each of the parties shall divide the 
proceeds equally. 
6. Plaintiff's retirement is worth $10,000.00 and 
Defendant's is worth $3,000.00. Adjusting for one-half (1/2) the 
value of each otherfs retirement leaving a credit in favor of 
Defendant in the amount of $3,500.00. As an offset, Plaintiff is 
awarded a credit of $3,000.00 for improvements to the home leaving 
a total credit in favor of Defendant from the $3,500.00 to 
$3,000.00 in the sum of $500.00. 
7. Defendant is awarded a credit of $2,349.00 as and for 
one-half (1/2) of the cash value of the insurance policy of the 
parties. 
8. Defendant is awarded alimony in the sum of $1.00 per 
year. 
-4-
9. Defendant is awarded a judgment against Plaintiff for 
attorney's fees in the sum of $275.00, plus costs in the sum of 
$2.50. 
10. Based upon the credits and net values of property the 
respective values and creidts/debits are determined as follows: 
Plaintiff 
Home 
Net credit of retirement and 
home improvements 
Car (1/2 equity) 
Personal property 















11. Plaintiff is ordered to maintain the children as 
beneficiaries on at least one-half of his life insurance and to 
maintain the same in force so long as the children are minors. 
12. Each should be and is awarded the property now in their 
possession. 
13. Defendant shall be and is awarded alimony in the sum of 
$1.00 per year. 
14. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of 
$50.00 per month as and for child support which may be deducted 
from the monthly payment of the lien to Defendant from Plaintiff. 
OLSON, HOGGAN 
& SORENSON 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
56 WEST CENTER 
P O BOX 525 









HAND CARRY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand carried an exact copy of the 
foregoing Corrected Supplemental Judgment and Decree to Arden W. 
Lauritzen at 180 North 100 East, P. 0. Box 171, Logan, Utah 
84321 , postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this \w-' day of December, 
1983. 
^-^'. / . ,(' /', 















Tape Recorder (Akai) 
Microwave Oven 




Green Couch (2ea) 
New Sofa (2ea) 
Flowered Chair 
Dresser & Chest of Dr 
Card Tables (2ea) 




Hanging Seats (2) 
Antique Table 






























































































































































































Pots & Pans 
Silverware & etc. 
Camp Stove 
Bedding 
Carpet for stairs 
Tile for Entry 
Sleeping Bags (2ea) 
Chain Saw (Gas) 
Chain Saw (Electric) 
Saber Saw 
1/2" Drill 
Antique Chairs (3ea) 

























































































































































































































Couch (brown section) 
Antique coffee table 
Kitchen dining set 
Chest of drawers (2) 
Cast iron grill 
Desk 
Wood buring stove 
Hanging light 
(cappa shell) 
Wooden hanging light 












































Ice Chest (cooler) 
Igloo cooler (5 gal.) 
Chaise Lounge 
Shower pulsator 
Ping Pong Table 
Games & Puzzles 
Piano Books 
Portable TV 
















































































































































































































































IN THE FIRST, JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. COUNTY OF, CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN VINCENT TOONE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RUBY JOAN TOONE, nka 
RUBY JOAN PARKHURST, 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER I S BEFORE THE COURT u p o n a M o t i o n f o r Summary 
Judgment and D e f e n d a n t ' s C r o s s - M o t i o n f o r Summary Judgment and an 
O b j e c t i o n h a s now been f i l e d t o t h e p r o p o s e d O r d e r g r a n t i n g Summary 
Judgment i n f a v o r of t h e P l a i n t i f f . 
Wi th r e s p e c t t o O b j e c t i o n No. 1, t h e l a n g u a g e s u g g e s t e d by t h e 
D e f e n d a n t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . Though t h e r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d by 
t h e D e f e n d a n t migh t be a p p r o p r i a t e , i t would r e q u i r e an e v i d e n t i a r y 
h e a r i n g t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r and what c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , o t h e r t h a n 
t h o s e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e F i n d i n g s , were made by t h e t r i a l j u d g e i n 
1 9 8 2 h e a r i n g r e l a t i v e t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y . F o r 
e x a m p l e , i f t h e C o u r t , a t t h a t t i m e , d e t e r m i n e d t o d i v i d e t h e 
p r o p e r t y e q u a l l y a n d g a v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o some v a l u e i n t h e 
m i l i t a r y r e t i r e m e n t , t h a t w o u l d h a v e t o b e d e t e r m i n e d w i t h an 
e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g a n d m a y n e v e r b e s u b j e c t t o f i n a l 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 
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Though i t c o u l d be a r g u e d now, f i f t e e n (15) y e a r s a f t e r t h e 
f a c t , t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t s h o u l d h a v e a p o r t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y 
r e t i r e m e n t b e c a u s e i t h a d v a l u e a t t h a t t i m e a n d w a s n o t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y a p p o r t i o n e d p u r s u a n t t o Woodward i n t h e D i v o r c e 
D e c r e e , t h e C o u r t wou ld h a v e t o know a l l of t h e d e t a i l s of t h e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which were a v a i l a b l e a t 
t h a t t i m e . 
"The rule of res judicata precludes litigation of issues 
that could properly have been raised and applies to every 
question relevant to and following within the preview of 
the initial action with respect to matters of both claim 
or grounds of recovery and defense which could have been 
presented by the exercise of good diligence." 46 Am. 
Juris 2nd Judgments Sec. 26. 
In this case, certainly the value of the military retirement 
could have and may have been considered by the Court. That the 
Court did not have jurisdiction to order distribution of military 
retirements did not preclude consideration of the value of the 
retirement or offsetting that with other property. If the Court 
did not then address the issue with respect to military retirement, 
and should do so now, it would have to relitigate each of those 
other property and support issues which have been raised, 
litigated, and ruled upon. In doing so, the rule of res judicata 
would be voided. It would be inappropriate to litigate this issue 
where it could have been raised then, but was not, because now it 
TOONE v, TOONE 
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could be only addressed independently without reassessing all of 
the other property which is subject to res judicata. 
One of the reasons for the doctrine of res judicata, as well 
as the statute of limitations, and to some degree, laches, is to 
reach a point of finality in cases whereupon parties can rely upon 
what has been done. The language therefore requested by Defendant 
with respect to Objection No. 1 is denied. 
With respect to Objection No. 2, relative to Paragraph 4 on 
page 4, the request is that the Court find when the statute of 
limitations began to run. The difficulty with this language is it 
can be argued that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary in 
order to determine when the Defendant became aware of the new 
statute or could or should have become aware. The presumption of 
law is that people become aware of public laws when they are 
passed. There was nothing argued relative to any incapacity or 
inability in the Defendant. Apparently, if she would show that she 
simply did not come across or have any reason to come across the 
law until recently, that does not toll any of the statute of 
limitations The Court would find that the statute of limitations 
began to run When the statute became effective, or the Decree 
became final, whichever last occurred. The problem with when the 
law was passed and became effective after the Decree, is that it 
might be argued that (despite state law to the contrary) perhaps 
TOONE v. TOONE 
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the passage of the new statute was a change in circumstances. A 
passage of a statute, in and of itself, is not, however, a change 
of circumstances. The language of the federal statute which allows 
state courts to dictate the distribution of military retirement, 
even on a retroactive basis, is not state law. Whether that allows 
for retroactive application would depend not only on the statute 
but also on state law relative to modification of decrees. The 
Objection then is denied to the extent above addressed. 
With respect to Objection No. 3, the Defendant is correct. 
The Court did, however, opine that, since principles of equity 
apply in divorce cases, and even though this is presented to the 
Court as a matter of law, equitable considerations would, based 
upon the affidavits and memoranda supplied, dictate that there 
should be finality to the judgment. The parties should be able to 
rely upon the decrees of the Court, and for the same reason that 
principles of equity may bar this type of action, the statute of 
limitations does likewise As mentioned above, at least some 
relationship with respect to searching for finality, that 
principles based on res judicata, laches, estoppel, as well as 
statute of limitations have in common. 
For the above reasons, Objection No. 4 is also somewhat well-
taken Though the Court did not conclude that, as a matter of law, 
res judicata, bars further action, the principles behind res 
^\ ^\( A 
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judicata and the reasons for it and the desires for finality, 
certainly affect this case. Though the Court's Findings do not 
mention military retirement as being adjudicated, the absence of 
the adjudication also makes applicable the doctrine of res 
judicata. To that extent, the Objection is sustained. 
With respect to Objection No. 5, the Objection is mis-styled 
and the McCartv decision does not forbid state courts from 
adjudicating military retirements. Federal law simply did not 
recognize state courts' adjudication of the same. Federal law in 
that instance pre-empted state law and therefore the state courts 
did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate military retirements, but 
more specifically what they did not have is recognition by the 
Federal government of military retirements. The fact that there 
was no adjudication of military retirement does not mean that the 
matter was not res judicata. The decision in fact was decided, the 
Decree is res judicata and that does not allow the Court to go back 
and reopen the issue as the distribution of the parties' property 
was in fact done in finality. 
The Defendant also objected to the proposed Order by the 
Plaintiff in total in that the Court did provide an opportunity to 
file a supplemental brief. The Court received the supplemental 
brief toqether with a Request for Reconsideration. 
TOONE v. TOONE 
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Defendant has argued that the Court should not, because this 
is a case of first impression in Utah, grant lightly Summary 
Judgment without considering evidence and facts as they relate to 
critical issues of law. The Defendant may understand that this 
case is not taken lightly and a summary disposition is not light 
treatment in any case. 
The problem with a hearing is the Court would not be benefited 
by evidence as to what occurred in the 1982 hearing other than what 
it has already received by way of affidavit. It has certainly been 
apprised of the fact that the Court did not specifically consider 
the military retirement, that the Defendant did not plead for 
military retirement or share the military retirement, that whether 
she did not do so because she was advised not to do so, is unknown 
to her or to the Court, nor would the Court be benefited by 
testimony by her counsel as to that issue as that can be supplied 
by affidavit and has not been so supplied. 
The deeper problem, however, is that the Court would have to 
relitigate and re-adjudicate all of the property issues which were 
adjudicated in the 1982 hearing. That would require a total 
reevaluation of all the distribution of the property including 
perhaps the distribution of the retirement of which the Plaintiff 
has been relying and anticipating. That throws out all of the 
reasons for statute of limitations and equitable considerations in 
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favor of finality and reliance. It is given that the Defendant was 
not informed about the change in federal law and that she received 
no actual knowledge about the change in federal law until 1995. 
The Court would not be benefited by any testimonial information 
thereon with respect to a hearing as it is not a fact in dispute. 
Nor is it disputed that she acted within reasonable time after she 
found out about the 1983 statute. That, however, does not resolve 
any of the issues. The fact that the military retirement was 
vested when the parties were married in 1979 but not payable for 
two (2) more years is not a fact in dispute either. 
Should the Court consider this matter to be a 60(b) motion, 
with respect to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excuse, neglect, 
newly discovered evidence, fraud, or service of process matters, 
such an action would have to be brought within three (3) months 
under 60(b) . With respect to whether the judgment is void, 
satisfied, released, discharged, or reversed or otherwise vacated, 
such may be brought later and on an independent action. Subsection 
7 of 60(b) provides and allows for any other reasons justifying 
relief or modification of judgment. "The Rule, of course, does not 
limit the power of the court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." There is, however, 
simply no allegation of fraud involved here nor does the Court 
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b e l i e v e t h a t 6 0 ( b ) c o n t r o l s t h e i s s u e and a l l o w s an i n d e p e n d e n t 
a c t i o n b y way o f p e t i t i o n t o m o d i f y t o be b r o u g h t a n d t h e r e b y 
c i r c u m v e n t s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i v e t o d o m e s t i c 
a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g c h a n g e o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e q u i t a b l e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u c h a s l a c h e s and e s t o p p e l . 
The D e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e C o u r t may 
r e s e r v e j u r i s d i c t i o n r e l a t i v e t o p r o p e r t y i s s u e s a n d d o e s n o t 
n e g a t e an a p p l i c a t i o n of s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . But e v e n i f i t 
d i d , b a s e d u p o n a l l t h e e v i d e n c e t h e C o u r t h a s b e f o r e i t , a n d 
a p p a r e n t l y t h e C o u r t w o u l d n o t b e n e f i t by t h e e v i d e n c e e x c e p t 
p e r h a p s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p a r t i e s ' p e r s o n a l f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n s , 
e q u i t a b l y t h e C o u r t w o u l d b e u n w i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e t h e r e l i e f 
r e q u e s t e d . 
The c a s e s c i t e d by t h e D e f e n d a n t r e l a t i v e t o t h e C o u r t ' s 
a u t h o r i t y and d i s c r e t i o n i n making e q u i t a b l e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n s , 
a l l p r o p e r t y w h i c h was on a l a t e r d a t e o f w h i c h p r o p e r t y was 
unknown o r u n d i s c l o s e d o v e r some r e a s o n no t e n t i r e l y a d j u d i c a t e d i s 
u n q u e s t i o n e d . Whether a t t h e t i m e of t h e Decree t h i s p r o p e r t y was , 
u n q u e s t i o n a b l y by f e d e r a l law, i n d e p e n d e n t and s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y of 
t h e P l a i n t i f f , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Cour t d i d n o t m e n t i o n o r a t t e m p t 
t o d i v i d e i t d o e s n o t now l e a v e i t open t o f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n a t a 
l a t e r t i m e and p r i n c i p l e s of res judicata a p p l y t o a l l t h e o t h e r 
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property involved and this then would have to be divided absent any 
consideration of that property which has already been divided. 
Certainly the Court recognizes the limited application of 
Green v. Green, and Gardner v. Gardner, cited by the Defendant and 
that military retirement should be considered in dividing assets to 
the parties, further that Woodward can apply now directly to 
marital property. 
The Defense opined and argued that because domestic actions 
specifically are equitable and subject to equitable remedies, and 
the statute of limitations is a matter of law, that the defense of 
laches is the only defense that can be asserted. As interesting a 
theory as that is, the defense can cite no law in support of that 
position. Certainly judgments which come out of a divorce action 
are subject to application of law and subject to statute of 
limitations execution. Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated 
relative to the Court's continued jurisdiction, does not negate the 
application of statute of limitations. Again, no law is cited for 
that theory. 
Defendant is correct, however, in that the issue of laches may 
not have applicability without having an evidentiary hearing. That 
would be true but for the fact the Defendant has also requested 
summary disposition in her favor which exposes Defendant then to a 
summary disposition against her for the same reasons. If the facts 
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are not an issue for a counter motion for summary judgment, they 
certainly can't be argued to be an issue with respect to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Though the Defendant is 
correct that laches cannot be imputed to one who is ignorant of the 
facts, the issue specifically implied here is whether the Defendant 
is ignorant, not of the facts, but of the law and certainly a 
knowledge of the law is imputed to the parties, otherwise the 
defense of not knowing the law could always be raised. 
The third point raised by the defense is that because the 
military retirement benefits earned during the marriage were not 
payable until a later event, they are more properly divided when 
that event occurs. That type of approach to these cases would lead 
the property distributions open for a long period of time. Absent 
an order to that effect, it would be inappropriate for the Court to 
allow the same. Certainly to some degree the Court's jurisdiction 
continues as the children become older and as the parties' alimony 
and support need to be adjusted when those changes occur, the Court 
can exercise its jurisdiction. But the military retirement 
benefits existed and were extant at the time of the Decree. The 
parties knew of them, and because of the status of the law or their 
understanding of the status of the law, did not apparently raise 
the issue at that time, does not allow them to be raised at later 
*~\ n 
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time when the law change and the parties become aware of the change 
in the law. 
The case in Marchant wherein the Court is said to have erred 
with respect the distribution of retirement benefits at the time of 
the divorce rather than the point of distribution of the benefits 
later, is inappropos. In that case, because there was inability to 
place a reasonable or realistic value of the retirement benefits, 
it would have been better to distribute them at a later time. But 
the Order for later distribution must have been in effect for that 
to become effective at the time of the Decree. In this case, there 
was no order for a later distribution mentioned at all, and to 
raise it now after some fifteen (15) years have passed would not 
only be inequitable but contrary to whole concept of litigation in 
order to resolve with some degree of finality the dispute between 
parties. 
As harsh as this remedy may appear, the aim of finality in 
litigation is beneficial. Parties live and rely upon decrees, in 
this case it can be assumed that the Plaintiff has relied on and 
expected military retirement in total, and to suggest now that it 
should be divided in half (1/2) may benefit the Defendant largely 
but certainly would work to the great detriment of the Plaintiff. 
Though there is no specific evidence or testimony on that issue, 
and that is one of the facts which Defendant argues would be heard 
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i n a d d r e s s i n g a h e a r i n g , i t c o u l d o n l y b e s o a f t e r t h e C o u r t 
d e t e r m i n e s t h a t s u c h a h e a r i n g would be a p p r o p r i a t e . B a s e d upon 
t h e law c i t e d by t h e p a r t i e s and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e r e o f , s u c h a 
h e a r i n g i s d e n i e d . 
The M o t i o n f o r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s d e n i e d . The O b j e c t i o n t o 
t h e p r o p o s e d F i n d i n g s has been a d d r e s s e d and b o t h o v e r r u l e d i n p a r t 
a n d s u s t a i n e d i n p a r t a s a b o v e a d d r e s s e d . C o u n s e l f o r t h e 
P l a i n t i f f i s d i r e c t e d t o p r e p a r e a n o t h e r O r d e r g r a n t i n g Summary 
Judgment c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s Memorandum D e c i s i o n . 
DATED thJk^Tc A4/ I *>?3fry of Sep tember , 1996 . 
</' °° ^0>> • V- BY THE C0URT 
\ ^ . ; - . • . • • > 
.' JUDGE G6RDON' J . LOW 
-FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN VINCENT TOONE, * 
* AMENDED ORDER GRANTING 
* SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * VJ40 
* Civil No. 19707 
RUBY JOAN TOONE, nka * 
RUBY JOAN PARKHURST, * 
* 
Defendant. * 
This matter came on before the court on May 15, 1996, upon the petition of the Defendant, 
Ruby Joan Toone, through her attorney, Marlin Grant, for division of retirement benefits. The 
petition was answered by the PlaintiiBf through his attorney, George W. Preston. On or about January 
18, 1996, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgement, which Motion was answered by the 
Defendant and the Defendant filed a Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The court, having considered the matter carefully, as a result of the submission by the parties 
of uncontested facts, which the court acknowledges as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant were married on June 20, 1958. 
2. The parties were divorced on July 6, 1981. The Divorce Decree reserved for trial at 
a later date the issue of the division of real and personal property. 
3. A hearing for the division of personal property was held on July 9, 1982 before the 
honorable VeNoy Christoffersen. 
4. Thereafter the court on or about December 17, 1983 entered a Supplemental 
Judgment and Decree dividing the assets of the parties, including, but not limited to, personal 
property, automobiles, real estate, retirement benefits, alimony, and lump sum payments by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant. 
5. The Plaintiff entered military service in May of 1958 and retired in 1969 and thereafter 
served with the Military Reserves and Air National Guard for eleven years, ultimately retiring in 1976. 
The Plaintiffs military retirement was earned as of 1976, but is not payable until the Plaintiff reaches 
age 60 on May 3, 1998. 
6. The Congress of the United States enacted Public Law 97-252 on September 8, 1982, 
to become effective on February 1, 1983, and was entitled the Uniformed Services Former Spouses 
Protection Act and was codified under United States Code, Title 10, Section 1408. 
7. An amendment to the act was passed by Congress making the Act retroactive to June 
26, 1981. 
8. The act recognizes the right of state courts to distribute military retirement or retainer 
pay to a spouse or former spouse. The act itself does not provide for an automatic entitlement to the 
former spouse of a portion of the member's pay. 
9. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah decided the case of Woodward v. Woodward 
on November 4, 1982, approximately four months after the hearing to determine a division of 
property rights and approximately 1 1/2 months prior to the entry of a Supplemental Decree by the 
District Court of Cache County. 
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I li I >elnidanl tiled i Petition for Modification of the Supplemental Decree on or 
about October 23, 1995. 
The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment addresses the following issues: 1) 
Whether or not the action brought h\ Ik Dclendanl isln.'vond Ihc statutes i>f limitations; 2) W hether 
or not the Defendant has waived or relinquished any claim she may have to the Plaintiffs military 
retirement, *) W Mel her oil not tl le Defendant is entitled to a portion of the military retirement under 
the decisions of Woodward v. Woodward and Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 
12. The Defendant replied to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Disposition and made a 
Cross-Motion for Si jmmaiv Disposition alleging as follow s 1) That the doctrine of res judicata did 
not bar the modification; 2) That the Defendant was not guilty of latches nor is estopped from 
asserting her claims; 3) That the Throckmorton v. Throckmorton case decided by the Court of 
Appeals in 1988 was inapplicable to this case; 4) That thru1 has "kvii a substantial change in 
circumstances; 5) That the statute of limitations does not apply to divorce proceedings in cases where 
the court maintains niuiliihle powen. in am eel or equitably adjust divorce judgments; and 6) That 
the trial court's Supplemental Decree evidenced a clear intent to divide all of the parties' assets on an 
equal basis. 
13/. Each party replied to the memorandt i in > saliniilli il U\ flu ulhci parties and thevourt 
having taken the matters into consideration, and having in court received statements of uncontested 
facts by the parties as innffeis ol evidence to be admitted, and the court having reviewed the 
memorandums of the parties and having orally indicated the court's decision to the parties, to which 
the Defendant objected, Plaintiff submitted an Order, which Defendant objected to and the Court 
having issued a Memorandum Decision, it I-I heiehs I >RI)l-RI 1) and 41)11 T X J E D as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
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10. The Defendant filed a Petition for Modification of the Supplemental Decree on or 
about October 23, 1995. 
11. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment addresses the following issues: 1) 
Whether or not the action brought by the Defendant is beyond the statutes of limitations; 2) Whether 
or not the Defendant has waived or relinquished any claim she may have to the Plaintiffs military 
retirement; 3) Whether or not the Defendant is entitled to a portion of the military retirement under 
the decisions of Woodward v. Woodward and Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 
12. The Defendant replied to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Disposition and made a 
Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition alleging as follows: 1) That the doctrine of res judicata did 
not bar the modification; 2) That the Defendant was not guilty of latches nor is estopped from 
asserting her claims; 3) That the Throckmorton v. Throckmorton case decided by the Court of 
Appeals in 1988 was inapplicable to this case; 4) That there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances; 5) That the statute of limitations does not apply to divorce proceedings in cases where 
the court maintains equitable powers to correct or equitably adjust divorce judgments; and 6) That 
the trial court's Supplemental Decree evidenced a clear intent to divide all of the parties' assets on an 
equal basis. 
13. Each party replied to the memorandums submitted by the other parties, and the court 
having taken the matters into consideration, and having in court received statements of uncontested 
facts by the parties as proffers of evidence to be admitted, and the court having reviewed the 
memorandums of the parties and having orally indicated the court's decision to the parties, to which 
the Defendant objected, Plaintiff submitted an Order, which Defendant objected to and the Court 
having issued a Memorandum Decision, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
3 
2. I IMI Deli iiilant's Petition foi Moditir.itu n nil I In 1 Ms on e I )»eaee is hueb\ ilisinissed 
with prejudice. Defendant's Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
3. As a matter of law, the court has determined that the principles of latches and estoppel 
are inappropn,-* " r*e 
4. The court, as a matter of law, determines that the action brought by the Defendant is 
beyond the period of limitations Therefore, the Defendant is barred from bringing this action under 
the provision of Title 78-12-22 Utah Code Ann. 1953 (As Amended) The statute of limitations 
begins to run from the time of the rendition and entry of the judgment in this case, which was on 
Jul) (> P'hl of flu eftc ti\r date >t lb* I rdeial Mutton?) * I Smi ths Spouse Profcctn n \ct on 
February 1, 1983. 
5. The court further concludes that the rendition of the case of Woodward v. Woodward 
on November '1 I'»K2 in*n ha\e given the Defendant a claim loi military benefits under the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act of September 8, 1982, with an effective date of 
February 1, \{M\ uhu h was later made retroactive In I line 2, 1 >M Mm evci the court concludes 
that the action brought by the Defendant was not within the eight year period of limitations for either 
the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce on July 6, 1981, nor the hearing for the division of 
[Moperty held on tfit Inl\ ' I'WJ nor the enli\ ol the Supplemental Deciee on December 16, 1982 
6. The court furthers concludes that, as a matter of equity, the Defendant's filing of the 
petition fourteen years and four months aftei the niti\ < >l tli< I *< « lee ot 1 >i\oice does not entitle tin 
Defendant to relief from this court in the form of a Modification of the Decree of Divorce nor a 
separate action in equity. The parties should be able to rely on a Decree of a Court, and for the same 
reason 11 lal | nnupdJ* of equity ma* \m thisl\pei t nil HI tin titutenl I imitation ioes likewise 
4 
7. The court concludes as a matter of law that there has been no change of circumstances 
between the parties since the entry of the decree which would warrant a modification of the decree 
and that the change of a substantial change in circumstances by the Defendant has not been shown 
8 The court further concludes that the principals behind the doctrine of res judicata 
affect this case The Court's findings do not mention military retiremenet and the absence of the 
adjudication makes the doctrine of res judicata applicable to this case to the same extent as if the 
retirement benefits were mentioned 
9 The court concludes that the matter is res judicata, as the matter has been once 
judicially decided and has been authoritatively and finally settled by the decision of a court, although 
military retirement was not specifically addressed in the decree 
10. Each party shall pay their own costs of court and attorney's fees 
DATED this^ffiday of c ^ x ^ W 4 ^ / \ , 1996. 
^ District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing AMENDED 
ORDER GRATING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF to the Defendant's attorney, 
Marlin Grant, OLSON & HOGGAN, 88 West Center, P O Box 525, Logan, UT 84323-0525 on this 
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